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MORE SOCIOLOGY, MORE CULTURE, MORE POLITICS: 
OR, A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR  ‘CONVERGENCE’ STUDIES  
[6276 words]  
 
NICK COULDRY, GOLDSMITHS, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 
 
The term ‘convergence’ identifies important shifts in media's material conditions, and many 
recent writers (from Henry Jenkins to Manuel Castells, Clay Shirky to Clearles Leadbeater) 
have seen in those conditions the leaping-off point for wider accounts of cultural social and 
political change. In this article, I want to suggest however that the term ‘convergence culture’ 
blurs important processes of differentiation and stratification and so blocks a better 
understanding of the politics of convergence. We need, I will argue, a better account of the 
sociology and culture of convergence if we are to grasp the political potential, positive or 
otherwise, of the processes we bundle together under that name.  
 
I discuss Henry Jenkins' account of convergence culture in detail, first, because it has been  
one of the most prominent narratives we have so far of convergence, and second because 
seeing its limitations as an argument-type helps clarify what are the minimum conditions for 
an adequate understanding of the (possibly many and diverging) cultures of ‘convergence’.  
 
Debates about 'convergence' starts out from two premises. First, key features of the media 
environment are undergoing some crucial transformations. There is a huge expansion in types 
of media outlet and interface, and in content circulation across those interfaces. Many people 
outside media institutions are becoming involved in not just using but producing those 
interfaces. New forms of commentary (on the world, on media contents, and on others' 
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commentary on world or media) are springing up online. Underlying these new phenomena is 
a deeper shift in the economics of cultural production (Benkler 2006) that has its basis in the 
open architecture of the internet  and the benefits that some degree of interactive production 
have so far seemed to have for large commercial players. Compared with the more closed 
architecture of earlier media, the internet provides a situation where any person in principle 
can have access to, and make inputs to, a vastly expanded media environment from any point 
in space.  Today's media environment is not just saturated from particular directions but 
supersaturated from massively many directions, all in interaction with each other.  
 
In other respects, it is worth remembering, media change is not so radical. Earlier claims that 
traditional media (television, radio, the press) will simply be replaced by ‘new media’ are 
wide of the mark, even if the traditional newspaper format is facing severe challenge. In the 
UK for example, the consolidation of high speed internet access for most of the UK 
population has been accompanied by an increase in television consumption (OFCOM 2009), 
alongside the obvious increase in internet consumption.  Yet people are not increasing their 
time with media overall, so the explanation must be that multiple media are increasingly 
consumed concurrently (Woolard 2010). While overlapping consumption need not be 
convergent consumption (we can easily do unconnected things at the same time), the past five 
years have seen the emergence of new media habits based around convergence (the 
exchanging of television clips, mash-ups and commentary on YouTube is only the most 
obvious new habit). The digitalization of almost all media, enhanced downloading and 
uploading speeds, and the hypertext structure of all online space encourage convergent use. 
And, as Henry Jenkins rightly emphasises, intertextual linking and mutual commentary about 
media suit media industries at a time when they must compete ever more intensely for 
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tradable audience attention in this supersaturated environment without as yet clear models of 
economic sustainability online.  
 
The second premise of debate on ‘convergence culture’ is that, as it unfolds, this media 
tumult will challenge established forms of organization across many domains, from political 
to cultural production, from corporate decision-making to marketing. But the status of this 
premise is much less clear than that of the first. Take politics, for example. Few would deny 
the prevailing uncertainty over the substance and sites of today's politics. Multiple forms of 
globalization have intersected with more specific political crises to put into question national 
governments' legitimacy and basic capacity to govern (Pharr and Putnam 2000; Sassen 2006; 
Fraser 2007).  Meanwhile the social infrastructure of traditional forms of politics has, in 
countries such as the UK and USA, been in long-term decline (Turner 2001; Skocpol 2005).  
If national systems fail to provide the focus for a satisfactory politics, it is possible we will 
witness some rethinking of the 'politics of politics' (Beck 1997: 99; Balibar 2004: 114) and a 
rediscovery of 'ordinary politics' (Rosanvallon 2006; Bohman 2007). Possible, but as yet 
entirely uncertain.  
 
Claims made to see already the direction of a new politics based on the first premise 
(undeniable shifts in the infrastructure of cultural production) are increasingly common: they 
range from sales pitches for new types of interface, to attempts to move on from 
unsatisfactory top-down models of politics, to revolutionary calls to arms: Shirky (2007), 
Leadbeater (2008), Hardt and Negri (2005).  Henry Jenkins’ convergence culture thesis falls 
somewhere in between, arguing that the social practices emerging from media convergence 
may provide important clues to emerging new forms of politics, or at least their social 
preconditions, but at the same time beckoning us with infectious optimism into the new world 
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of connected action he has uncovered through his extensive empirical work over the past 
decade. Prima facie Jenkins offers an evidence-based account of the new media 
environment’s implications for wider culture and politics - an obvious advance on gestural 
accounts of change.  My argument however will be that, by closing his interpretative circle 
too quickly and too easily, Jenkins ignores key factors of differentiation and stratification 
within processes of convergence and so risks a radical misreading of contemporary media’s 
implications for wider culture and politics.   
 
While the following discussion will be quite critical of the argument Jenkins develops, let me 
acknowledge right away that it is a bold book by an author whose work since Textual 
Poachers has been important for my own.  Jenkins' book Convergence Culture tells us much 
of value about the types of cultural economy developing around particular entertainment 
products in an age of digital media and mobile audiences. In Chapter Two of the book 
Jenkins gives a vivid picture of the 'transmedia franchise' around products such as American 
Idol (61),1 and the role of brand tie-ins in reality TV (69-73). His argument that loyal 
consumers are of great value to media corporations searching for stable advertising income is 
plausible and resonates to some extent with Joseph Turow's (2007) wider analysis of the 
changing economics of attention-selling in the media industries. None of this is in question. 
My aim instead is to identify an important limitation of existing accounts of 'convergence' of 
which Jenkins' book is at most symptomatic rather than uniquely responsible.2  
 
My main focus will be Jenkins's claim that the habits of particular loyal media users will 
become typical, indeed exemplary, of the wider media audience, and that from this positive 
consequences flow for politics and public culture. A more adequate evidential base is needed, 
I suggest, than Jenkins provides. In discussing issues of evidence, two arguments will 
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intersect: one about what would be a good sociology of what’s going on in contemporary 
media practice, and a second about what would be a good reading of the culture, or cultures, 
that are emerging from the sum of those practices. Underlying my specific critique is a belief 
that other more productive framings of convergence are possible.  
 
Who are we talking about? 
 
Jenkins' convergence culture thesis stands, or falls, first of all as a general claim about the 
transformations to the media environment currently under way. Jenkins moves us decisively 
on from the idea of a simple transition from old to new media. As media history has regularly 
taught us (with the emergence of the telephone, radio, television, and home computers), 
media, like other technologies, develop more often through overlaps and connections 
between old and new than through simple substitutions: the remediation logic of digital 
media (Bolter and Grusin 2001) makes such substitutions even less likely.3 Prima facie, this 
undercuts the idea that a single convergence culture is emerging: why not expect something 
more diverse and fractured? Yet Jenkins' preference is for general prognosis. We have, he 
states, both 'a new media system' and 'a convergence culture' (3). The shifts under way are not 
a shift in technology, but 'a cultural shift' (3).  
 
Before, however, we can move to questions of broader cultural analysis, we need to get 
clearer on what Henry Jenkins believes is going on with media at the level of sociological 
description. Sometimes Jenkins expresses this quite cautiously as a matter of 'old and new 
media interact[ing] in ever more complex ways' (6): who could disagree with that? More 
often, however, Jenkins' argument involves specific claims not just about technological 
interfaces but about what media audiences do. He defines 'convergence' as 'the flow of media 
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across multiple platforms, the cooperation between multiple media industries, and the 
migratory behavior of media audiences who will go almost anywhere in search of the kinds 
of entertainment experiences they want' (2). His book, he writes, 'is about the work – and play 
– spectators perform in the new media system' (3). Here Jenkins (13-14) draws on Lisa 
Gitelman's important distinction between a medium as a technologically based delivery 
system and a medium as a set of 'associated protocols' (Gitelman 2008). Jenkins plausibly 
identifies the latter, as the place where convergence culture occurs. The term 'protocols' is 
useful, because it promises to capture the ordered way in which our practices in relation to 
media are changing, as users begin to deal with the interlocking functionalities of the multiple 
media devices in their lives (14-15). My analysis of Jenkins’s argument will be framed within 
my wider argument for researching media ‘as practice’ developed elsewhere (Couldry 2004). 
 
Where things become contentious is in Jenkins' interpretation of what changes are important. 
So he argues that a key feature of a world of convergent media is 'the social nature of 
contemporary knowledge construction' (20). Clearly, the opportunities for knowledge sharing 
have been greatly enhanced, especially in richer countries, by large majorities of the 
population having regular high-speed access to the web's networking capacities: even before 
the full growth of social networking sites, social reformers waxed lyrical about new forms of 
information sharing (Mayo and Steinberg 2007). But how social such processes are - and 
what type of sustained 'social' life they produce - is another question.  
 
Here Jenkins reveals the rather curious angle from which he observes this undeniable growth 
in information sharing, that of specialist media fans: 'to fully experience any fictional world, 
consumers must assume the role of hunter gatherers . . . comparing notes with each other via 
online discussion groups [etc]' (21, added emphasis).  But why should those who want to 
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'fully' experience fictional worlds be a particularly good guide to the general trends of 
'convergence  culture'? The claim cannot be that they are themselves typical of media 
consumers, since the key advance in fan studies in recent years has been to show that, for any 
media object, there is a spectrum of engagement and emotional investment, with each of us 
differently placed along that spectrum, depending on which object we take (Abercrombie and 
Longhurst (1998); Harrington and Bielby (1995)). Nor can the claim be that because 
entertainment fans go more deeply into certain popular cultural forms, they have a privileged 
vantage-point on culture as a whole; beyond a certain romantic populism, such a claim has 
little credibility. We need sociologically grounded reasons for privileging fans as cultural 
actors in the dynamics of wider convergence practice.  
 
So how can Jenkins' claim to generalise from what particular fans do to wider trends in 
practice?  To his credit Jenkins does not elide the difficulties. He acknowledges that he is 
studying 'early adopters' of convergence culture's opportunities who, as such, are 
'disproportionately white, male, middle-class and college-educated' (23). Some of his 
examples focus indeed on 'the most hardcore fans, a contingent known as the "spoilers"' (25): 
a precondition for being a spoiler of Survivor is, he notes, having a lot of free time to devote 
to the arduous research and networking involved (52). Later Jenkins acknowledges that those 
who go deeply into researching the details of The Matrix  plot exist 'around the edges' of that 
product's audience (130). Yet, in spite of these caveats, Jenkins still wants to claim 
generalizability for what his 'early adopters' do. Here he makes a crucial move after noting 
these groups' particularity: 'yet right now our best window into convergence culture comes 
from looking at the experience of the early settlers and first inhabitants' (23, added emphasis). 
Certainly, early adopters provide a window – perhaps the only window - onto the types of 
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practices Jenkins himself wants to foreground, but why assume that they are the best window 
onto wider convergence culture?  
 
Jenkins' most plausible argument seems to be that media industries themselves are disposed, 
for reasons of economic self-interest, to weight their product development towards users who 
are heavily engaged in their products. This sounds like Turow's point noted above (Turow 
2007) about the new targeting of advertising strategies on high-value consumers, because it is 
only those consumers whose trajectories across mediaspace generate stable and sellable 
patterns of 'attention' for advertising's own consumers. Turow is concerned with how 
economic value is increasingly seen as tied to techniques of individual consumer tracking that 
target both regularity and high transaction value. By contrast, Jenkins' media consumers are 
characterised by high intensity consumption. High intensity consumption of a product  may, 
or may not, involve high transaction value (both casual fans and intense fans may buy the 
same DVD once). And there is no reason to suppose that high intensity users (while 
undeniably benefiting media producers in some respects through their product commentary 
seen as unpaid product development) are also consumers whose transaction value is generally 
high: indeed these fans' high levels of free time may be associated with lower work 
commitments, which would suggest exactly the opposite. So if Jenkins' high-intensity 
consumers do not generate high transaction value (as in Turow's argument), the supposed 
justification for their selection as the consumers at whom product development will be 
targeted must lie elsewhere: either in their exemplarity or their typicality. If exemplarity, that 
works for particular sectors where producer communities are quite close to fan/consumer 
communities (games industries?), but why expect such sectors to be typical of media 
production generally? If fans' benefit to media producers derives from their typicality, then 
we are back to the implausible premise that Jenkins's argument was attempting to reinforce. 
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Let's take stock. Arguments for generalizing from the specific fan practices Jenkins 
foregrounds to everyone’s practices in relation to media are difficult to find. Arguments 
against such generalization are easier to find, and some, as already noted, are suggested by 
Jenkins himself: 
 
1. The most intense fans are highly untypical of the general audience in terms of their 
level of emotional investment;  
2. The broader pool of interested consumers from which the most intense fans are taken 
itself represents just one particular slice demographically (white, male, middle-class, 
college-educated): the 'convergence culture' thesis must therefore be more widely 
tested before it becomes useful; 
3. More intense fans are likely to have higher levels of disposable time than the general 
population, simply because intense fandom requires knowledge acquisition and 
knowledge performance (both of which take time). The following groups with less 
disposable time are therefore likely to be under-represented among those practising 
intense fandom: those with heavy job commitments (for example multiple jobs to 
make ends meet); those with heavy family commitments. And of course there are 
other types of enthusiasm in contemporary culture which have little to do with media 
entertainment (playing sport, playing music, gardening, DIY, and indeed civic 
activism). Yet there is no reason to think that those with the latter enthusiasms or in 
the former social circumstances are less typical of the general audience. So why think 
that a sub-group (intense media fans) in whom these other groups are under-
represented is more likely to be typical of the habits and interests which will come to 
define our cultures of convergence?  
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4. Jenkins' particular (and for his argument necessary) emphasis on young fans is also a 
limitation. We can argue that youth are the future (in terms of political hope they no 
doubt are) but that is very different from arguing that today's young people will 
continue their current media habits into the future, even as their life circumstances 
change. In sociological generalization, there is the perennial difficulty of 
distinguishing major shifts between generations from differences of life-stage. No one 
is suggesting the age-related factors that shape long-term media habits – owning or 
renting one’s living space, having a stable partner and/or children, having regular paid 
work – are becoming irrelevant to media use: why should they? 
5. A deeper danger is of assuming that, in a process of continuous multidimensional 
transformation (the media/society/politics interface is nothing less than that), changes 
that strike us as novel from within that transformation are necessarily the most 
significant indicators of future development. Put crudely, there is the risk of forgetting 
the continued importance of the larger frame within which the changes that divert us 
stand out. This is a danger I have discussed elsewhere (Couldry 2009) by considering 
the argument that ‘the media’ as central social reference-points will simply wither 
away. It arises also in relation to the supposedly transformative potential of 
‘convergence culture’.  
 
Those are the weaknesses. A strength of Jenkins' argument is that it is not based on a 
technological determinism. It is a potentially cultural argument about the implications of 
emerging protocols of technology use. But by relying on examples shaped by highly 
particular demographic and other factors it is ill-suited to ground generalizations about how 
media practice is changing. What then does the ‘convergence culture’ thesis amount to, as a 
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contribution to the sociology of audience practices, beyond a story that media industries want 
to tell to themselves about the new terms on which they will continue to matter? 
 
Is there a culture of convergence?  
 
It is the weaknesses with his argument about convergence, seen as sociological claims about 
audience practice, that drive Jenkins to make wider claims about the supposed ‘cultural’ 
shifts under way through convergence. He claims for example that highly networked fans 
represent the 'new knowledge culture' which is becoming of increasing importance as other 
social ties break down (27); elsewhere, just as boldly, he claims that a new 'more democratic 
mode' of knowledge production is developing which is part of 'a more participatory form of 
power' (29). Later in the book, Jenkins amplifies such claims through a reading of histories of 
political innovation or affective marketing as if their driving force was the older history of 
fan production (61-62; 220): a very partial reading of both politics and marketing to say the 
least (for the latter, see Andrejevic in this special issue). Jenkins also tends to use the term 
'community' uncritically to reinforce a positive impression of the social dimensions of what 
fans do (37, 160). It is unclear how we would distinguish a ‘community’ of fans from 
something less binding or structured. But while ‘community’ is a notoriously tricky term in 
all contemporary discourse, the deeper problem of Jenkins’s argument is with the word 
‘culture’.  
 
Even though at many points Jenkins acknowledges tensions within convergence culture, he 
uses the word 'culture' principally, like many others before him, to identify a shared set of 
transformations from which certain common values and forms of meaning-making emerge. I  
do not dismiss for one moment the importance of this understanding of culture, or its 
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potential for being used in critical, non-totalising ways, for example Raymond Williams’ 
critical notion of ‘common culture’ (Williams 1958). But there is another way of 
understanding 'culture'  - in terms not of shared values, but of a common infrastructure for 
disseminating meaning and symbols in complex and unequal spaces of circulation (Hannerz 
1992) - which may be more appropriate to convergence. The notion of ‘convergence’ starts 
out (the first assumption discussed in my introduction) with the idea that certain types of 
articulation between consumption, production and commentary are now not merely enabled 
but become routine aspects of media use, and without any special skills being necessary for 
involvement in such hybrid processes. Such processes become basic dimensions in many 
societies of how large majorities of the population are able to routinely interact with each 
other. But in whatever sense we talk of convergence culture, an understanding of how the 
multiple possibilities of convergence are socially distributed is essential to grasping the 
politics of the transformations under way.  
 
Does that suggest there is a thing called ‘convergence culture’? Only if we believe that these 
new modes of articulated action involving media in themselves are sufficiently distinct from 
the multiple conditions and aims of everyday action to be considered in isolation from them. 
But why believe that? Do we believe in ‘television culture’, ‘radio culture’ or ‘telephone 
culture’ as unified structures that can be recognised and tracked? The multiple cultures that 
cluster around media technologies are surely too diverse for such an approach to be useful. 
The argument applies with even greater force to ‘convergence’, understood as an open-ended 
set of complex facilities related to media: convergence  is simply not the type of thing around 
which it makes sense to expect a ‘culture’ (in the traditional sense of the word) to cohere. It 
may be more plausible to see ‘convergence’ as a resource for differentiation between media 
users, and so - once we take into account the class, gender, ethnic and other hierarchies that 
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characterize the social spaces in which ‘convergence’ is practised – a medium of longer-term 
stratification.  Regions of convergence practice may cohere if they are underpinned by clear 
shared interests and affinities (the sort of fan cultures Jenkins has long studied), but such 
convergence 'cultures' are likely to be exceptions in a much larger space of differentiation. 
implications for the potential politics of convergence. In some locations, convergence 
'cultures' may emerge around particular media interfaces (blogging in south Korea perhaps? 
Telenovela commentary in Brazil?) but more work is required to confirm this; in others, it is 
precisely the stratification of life changes that is the starting-point for understanding how the 
affordances of media 'convergence' are used by different social groups: see for example Qiu 
(2009) on the Chinese working class. 'Cultures' of convergence are, then, possible, but the 
singular term convergence 'culture' is of limited use. This has implications for the potential 
politics of convergence and researching convergence. 
 
The uneven politics of convergence 
 
In so far as Henry Jenkins' convergence culture thesis attempts to generalize from the fan 
practices he discusses, it is built on thin sociological and cultural foundations. But Jenkins 
offers another type of argument about convergence: an argument about politics. Jenkins 
claims that some of the things early adopters of convergence culture do already constitute a 
new form of politics or at least enact a key means for that new politics. They do so by 
exercising 'creative intelligence' (235, discussing Pierre Levy (2000)) and the 'collective 
power' of audiences (4). Jenkins argues that the 'skills' we are now learning within 
convergence culture as audience members (voting, circulating, commenting, lobbying, and so 
on) are skills that we will be deploying 'for more "serious" purposes, chang[ing] the ways 
religion, education, law, politics, advertising and even the military operate' (4). Let's put to 
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one side issues of generalization (and prediction) and focus on what constitutes 'politics' for 
Jenkins.  
 
There is no doubt that increasingly broad access to the many-to-many communications space 
of the web (its potential for what Castells calls 'mass self-communication': Castells 2009) is 
leading to new practices of monitoring and sometimes challenging institutional power. While 
Jenkins' examples of institutional porosity relate to entertainment industries (for example the 
spoiling of the Survivor plot: chapter 1), such accelerated collective communication is 
unquestionably being seen in other domains, such as politics (witness the events of June 2009 
in Iran). Jenkins himself develops the link to politics explicitly in chapter 6 when he discusses 
image mashups made during Howard Dean's failed campaign to become Democratic 
candidate for the US presidency in 2004; the Obama Presidential campaign of 2008 
undeniably offered enhanced evidence of online political mobilization through horizontal 
networks (Castells 2009: 363-402). To this extent, the technoliberalism of Ithiel de Sola Pool 
that Jenkins is fond of quoting seems justified: 'freedom is fostered when the means of 
communication are dispersed, decentralized, and easily available' (11, quoting Pool).  Who 
would not celebrate this? Indeed my own work on media rituals has been oriented towards a 
horizon where the means of communication become less centralized and more dispersed 
(Couldry 2003: chapter 8). But the problem with Jenkins' argument lies elsewhere. 
 
Jenkins comments explicitly at times on the gap between the practices he uncovers and a 
fuller, more democratic politics: 'audiences have a long way to go if they are going to exploit 
the points of entry that affective economics offers them for collective action and grassroots 
criticism of corporate conduct' (92). But at other times the sweep of Jenkins' argument is less 
discriminating. First, Jenkins quotes without qualification the metaphorical use of political 
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language within the entertainment industries, for example Raph Koster's comment about 
MMORPG: 'it's not just a game. It's a service, it's a world, it's a community . . . just like it is 
not a good idea for a government to make radical legal changes without a period of public 
comment, it is often not wise for an operator of an online world to do the same' (quoted 160). 
Second, when Jenkins talks of the bargaining and power-play that happens around online 
entertainment, for example when large contingents of fans challenge industry decisions to 
withdraw a series, he implies this is a form of challenge to corporate power on a par with any 
other: 'a politics based on consumption  . . . may represent a powerful force when striking 
back economically at core institutions can directly impact their power and influence' (222, 
original emphasis, cf 63). If Jenkins had provided examples of online consumers using 
similar practices to 'strik[e] back economically' to challenge the labour policies of 
corporations or Wall Street bankers' bonus culture (that is, important corporate power in other 
domains), that would be interesting, but he does not. Third, Jenkins' account of the potential 
politics of convergence culture risks thinness when he suggests that online talk is by itself 
positive, if it bridges difference. Here Jenkins' comments  are either banal ('the challenge is to 
create a context where people of different backgrounds actually talk and listen to one another' 
(235)) or bizarre : '[the game] America's Army  . . . may  be more effective at providing a 
space for civilians and service folk to discuss the serious experience of real-life war than as a 
vehicle for propaganda' (79). To say that a game may generate productive conversations 
between particular individuals takes us nowhere because it is silent on how any such talk is, 
or is not, articulated to wider contexts of action and debate.  
 
The problem then with Jenkins' argument is that it works ostensively: by pointing to examples 
of specific convergent practice, and then claiming that in themselves they are already 
examples of politics; no account is provided of the wider forces that night connect such 
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pockets of talk and action to wider mechanisms of social change and political challenge. This 
type of argument risks offering little more than the truism: people are collecting and 
exchanging information in new ways and this is potentially positive for democracy under 
conditions yet to be specified (how could it not be? we are back here, from the perspective of 
politics, to the weaknesses of Jenkins’s account of culture). What of the forces which may be 
undermining such articulations – the forces of disarticulation working against the possibility 
of a more democratic politics? On these forces, Jenkins is silent. He mentions nowhere the 
individualizing force of neoliberal politics which provides a crucial context for all forms of 
contemporary politics, including the developments he mentions (see for example Bauman 
2001). Might not the individualizing rhetoric of neoliberalism have some role in shaping 
whether convergence actions online ever achieve the status of political action, let alone 
politics that is in any sense progressive? Let's remember that Sarah Palin has lots of friends 
on Facebook too.  
 
An Alternative Approach to the Politics of Convergence  
 
My point is not that Henry Jenkins' fails to specify his own vision of a progressive politics in 
Convergence Culture. There is after all no reason why he should: his book is not primarily 
about politics and in any case it leaves little doubt as to Jenkins' broad sympathies with 
progressive positions. My argument rather is that, first, when Jenkins discusses the proto-
politics of 'convergence culture', he provides little evidence that the acts he identifies are 
likely to be associated with progressive rather than with other sorts of politics; and, second, 
he ignores some obvious contextual factors which might lead to the appropriation of 
convergence culture for non-progressive politics, above all neoliberal discourse’s closing 
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down of the parameters of acceptable political action.4  The potential politics of convergence 
culture are, on the evidence of Jenkins' book, undecideable.  
 
Inevitable, you might say: how could a descriptive account of what people are doing with 
media of itself  provide the key to unlock the new forms of political action that are growing, 
unseen, among us? And that is precisely my point. Even if Henry Jenkins has identified 
convincingly a particular re-distribution of communicative resources (on which I have raised 
various doubts), that would still fall far short of identifying evidence, and a causal 
mechanism, for wider democratization. Surely there are other conditions of democratization 
than merely a shift in communication resources. Nearly 20 years ago Walter Wriston, ex-
chairman of Citicorp and a follower (like Jenkins) of Ithiel de Sola Pool, announced that 'the 
new electronic infrastructure of the world turns the whole planet into a market place for ideas 
. . . We are thus witness to a true revolution; power really is moving to the people' (Wriston 
1992: 176). But the past two decades have offered little sign of such a shift in power. Is there 
any more reason to believe in Jenkins' revival of this technoliberal vision two decades later?  
 
The only plausible way to understand the politics of convergence is to develop a better 
sociological and cultural analysis of what people are doing with and around media. From that 
perspective, we might welcome Jenkins' book for the debate to which it has helped focus, but, 
having  done so, we need very quickly to give serious attention to a number of factors that 
complicate any single account of what convergence ‘culture’ might be. First, there are the 
socioeconomic and cultural forces which are stratifying technological access, use and skills in 
a convergent media environment: see for important perspectives Kling (1999), Livingstone 
(2002), Van Dijk (1999).5 Second, there is the long history of research which has brought out 
how political engagement is deeply shaped by demographic factors (gender, class, ethnicity), 
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but also, linking them all, by particular societies' wider discursive economy which distributes 
social recognition often with great unevenness: Pateman (1970), Croteau (1995).6 Such 
stratification of political engagement may, or may not, be mitigated by the discursive 
economy that grows around convergent media: to find out, we need research that is much 
more sensitive to the possible fissures within emergent cultures of politics, and considers the 
possible geographical variations between the inclusiveness (or otherwise) of political 
cultures, whether in China, India, USA, UK, Argentina, Egypt, Mexico, or anywhere else. 
Third, there are the broader stratifying factors which shape the spheres of action of different 
types of people in contemporary societies. Let’s suppose, for a moment, that almost everyone 
in some  societies (plausibly South Korea) can reach the level of interactive skill and literacy 
necessary to participate in convergence activities. That does not tell us anything about the 
divergent conditions under which men compared with women put those basic skills to use in 
any particular society. Here the exploitative longue durée of how domestic labour and public 
status are distributed between men and women remains crucial: indeed it finds its new 
reproductive means in the skills associated with convergent media (see Ouellette and 
Wilson’s article in this edition). Equally crucial to understanding such divergences are 
international comparisons, another dimension seemingly ignored in Jenkins’ account. What if 
uses of convergent media are differently stratified in Lebanon compared with South Africa, 
for example?7 These are differences we need to understand and they are obscured by the 
generality of the term ‘convergence culture’. 
 
Such an alternative approach to researching convergence would turn, finally, to the 
conditions under which a newly structured communications environment might, in spite of 
these deep constraints, nonetheless over time, through the new communicative interaction it 
fosters, generate new ways of imagining the future of democratic politics. This perhaps is the 
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point where Jenkins' vision and a more sociologically grounded account of convergence 
might themselves converge, but it lies as yet at a distant point on our knowledge horizon. We 
can look hopefully at the practice and rituals of so-called 'convergence culture' and imagine a 
new politics springing up, just as in the late 17th and early 18th century political visionaries 
looked hopefully at the book for signs of humanities’ self-transformation. But as yet almost 
all the content of that vision remains to be filled in. For now, I suggest, it would be more 
productive to put our visions aside, and attend more closely to the conflicted diversity of what 
goes on under the hopeful badge of ‘convergence’. 
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1 Unless stated otherwise, page references are to Jenkins (2006). 
2
 For a wider exploration of such issues, see Couldry (forthcoming, chapter 5). 
3
 Compare Jenkins (2006: 13-14). 
4
 On neoliberalism there is a literature that began before Jenkins’ book and goes on growing: Giroux 
(2004); Harvey (2005); Grossberg (2005); Ouellette and Hay (2008); Couldry (2010). 
5
 For more detailed discussion, see Couldry (2007). 
6
 The recognition of education's role in shaping political engagement goes back even to the original 
much criticised civic culture thesis: Almond and Verba (1963). 
7
 For excellent analysis of audience practices in these two locations, see respectively Kraidy (2009) 
and Takahashi (2009). 
